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STRUCTURALIST LEGAL HISTORIES 
JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article’s contribution to the symposium Theorizing Contemporary 
Legal Thought, I inquire into some of the topic’s methodological difficulties. In 
particular, I suggest that, as the writing of contemporary legal thought is the 
writing of a kind of history, we ought to pay attention both to the special 
historiographical challenges we are likely to experience as well as those avenues 
that may better ease our passage into a telling of the “legal contemporary.” 
Ultimately, my argument is that, although it has been in the periphery for a 
generation, structuralist legal history may be an edifying way of usefully 
constructing a history of contemporary legal thought.1 
But first things first. Perhaps you haven’t heard of contemporary legal 
thought. This could be because you already know it, only by another name, 
maybe the “new private law”2 or “new legal realism.”3 Or maybe contemporary 
legal thought is a mystery due to a temptation to look for analogies in other 
disciplines, like art history.4 If so, the idea of “contemporary art” may seem of 
little use, however, since we typically suspect legal history and art history to be 
very different things.5 Trying a different approach, you might wonder if 
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 1.  For a fuller account of the relation between legal structuralism and contemporary legal 
thought, see Justin Desautels-Stein, Pragmatic Liberalism: The Outlook of the Dead, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
1041 (2014) [hereinafter Desautels-Stein, Pragmatic Liberalism]. 
 2.  Symposium, New Legal Realism, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 797 (2006); Symposium, Is It Time 
For a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335 (2005). 
 3.  Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (2012). 
 4.  RICHARD MEYER, WHAT WAS CONTEMPORARY ART? 16 (2013). See generally Julieta 
Aranda et al., What is Contemporary Art? Issue Two, 12 E-FLUX JOURNAL A1, A1 (2010); Tom 
McDonough, Response, Questionnaire on the Contemporary, 130 OCTOBER 122 (2009).  
 5.  For one view of why it would not be good to make such an analogy, see generally J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1663 (2010). On the relation 
between aesthetics and law, see Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of 
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contemporary legal thought is a meaningful category at all. Might it not be the 
same thing as the “modern” legal thought of the first half of the twentieth 
century? If not, and “modern” and “contemporary” have different meanings in 
legal history, what could they be?6 Falling further, you might even wonder 
whether “modern” has any stable meaning, much less a “postmodern” 
contemporary. 
Interestingly, in whichever register we ask it, the question of contemporary 
legal thought has rarely been answered.7 One possible explanation for this lack 
is the balkanized state of legal studies in the United States, a condition in which 
judges, lawyers, and legal academics might operate in an intricately fragmented 
grid of expertise.8 From this point of view, when we imagine “law” what we 
envision is something like the law school faculty webpage, divided up into its 
disparate areas of experts.9 There are the business law experts, the civil rights 
experts, the constitutional law experts, the international law experts, and so 
on.10 In “normal” times, these departments of expertise are not understood as 
 
Reconstruction, 4 YALE J. L. & HUM. 351 (1992); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002). See also COSTAS DOUZINAS & ADAM GEAREY, CRITICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE (2005); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL 
EMBLEMS AND THE ART OF LAW: OBITER DEPICTA AS THE VISION OF GOVERNANCE (2013); LAW 
AND THE ARTS (Susan Tiefenbrun ed., 1999); LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND 
THE AESTHETICS OF LAW (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999). 
 6.  For a recent treatment of sociological jurisprudence in the United States, which might be the 
best candidate for taking the label “modern legal thought,” see DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2012). See also JOHN 
HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (2011); G. 
Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early 
Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972). 
 7.  The exception is Duncan Kennedy. See Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in 
Contemporary American Legal Thought, 25 LAW & CRITIQUE 91 (2014); Duncan Kennedy, Three 
Globalizations in Law and Legal Thought, 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2005). 
 8.  Martin Flaherty has spoken to this in a different context, but I think his point is still 
illustrative:  
Assessing how well a given theorist has relied on history presupposes that there are standards 
for making this assessment. Those standards most plausibly come from the discipline of 
history itself. This conclusion follows not so much because historians determine what is 
historically true, but because they commonly resolve what is historically convincing . . . .  
[R]emaining respectable is a belief in specialization. University departments, professional 
associations, topical journals, and electronic mail ‘listservs’ all testify to the ongoing 
assumption that the overall community needs smaller groups of experts to develop more 
specialized standards for the exploration of narrower fields. A final widespread assumption 
involves deference to these groups of specialists. Perhaps even more dramatically than other 
fields, the law has formalized this principle in relaxing the general evidentiary prohibition 
against opinion testimony for experts.  
Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 551 
(1995).  
 9.  For two critiques of “legal expertise,” see DAVID KENNEDY, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: NEW 
THINKING ABOUT LAW AND POLICY (forthcoming 2015); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the 
Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 973–76 (2005).  
 10.  As William Nelson saw it, most legal historians have traditionally focused on the common law, 
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having much to do with one another. Moreover, the debates that go on within 
these areas among the experts themselves splinter the territory even further. 
The history of the legal disciplines, according to this balkanized view, is a 
history of shards.11 As Christopher Tomlins has suggested, “This is the scholarly 
world we live in now, a world of beauteous fragments that lacks a kaleidoscope, 
a world of noncausal relationality.”12 
Although there are sure to be any number of causes for our scholarly 
hermitry, I suspect that this “beauteous fragmentation” is partially a residue of 
the postmodernism that arrived at American law schools in the 1980s,13 and that 
it is this residue that now works as a block on our theorizing about 
contemporary legal thought.14 That is, one possible reason for our general lack 
of conversation about the “legal contemporary” is that we have arrived at a 
place in which it has become increasingly difficult to have such conversations.  
Poststructuralist views of law have yielded an orientation toward legal history 
whereby the idea of unities and cross-cutting “totalizations” have become 
increasingly suspect, and “grand narratives” about evolving periods of legal 
thought have gone out of fashion.15 But as the broad sweeps have been 
 
with a particular emphasis on property law. The history of regulation and the Constitution have also 
been recurring topics. “Most legal historians, then as now, engaged in narrow research . . . . But even as 
they addressed narrower topics, the professional orientation of most scholars in the discipline pointed 
toward the investigation and analysis of subjects of concern to their contemporaries in law.” William E. 
Nelson, Legal History before the 1960s, in THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 1 
(William E. Nelson & John Reid eds., 1985). 
 11.  The point is made in reverse in MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE WRITING OF HISTORY (Tom 
Conley trans., 1988). Though I intend to foreground the relationship between fragmented history and 
the “postmodern” collapse of conceptions about objectivity in the social sciences, I do not mean to 
suggest that there was ever a time when the universe of historical experience was somehow “available.” 
For the seminal twentieth-century critique, see generally R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 
(1946).  
 12.  Christopher Tomlins, What is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique? Revisiting 
Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 155, 158 (2012). 
 13.  It is easy to write poststructuralism more broadly than it ought to be. In this article, I am 
focusing almost entirely on legal scholars in the 1980s working under the influence of Jacques Derrida. 
I also do not mean to deny the presence of any number of other influences.  
 14.  Some will no doubt point to the so-called “linguistic turn” of the 1960s as the culprit here. For 
general overviews, see, e.g., THE LINGUISTIC TURN (Richard Rorty ed., 1967); WILLIAM H. SEWELL, 
JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY (2005); Judith Surkis, When Was the Linguistic Turn? A Genealogy, 117 AM. 
HIST. REV. 700 (2012). On Cambridge School contextualism, see Peter E. Gordon, Contextualism and 
Criticism in the History of Ideas, in RETHINKING MODERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 32 
(Darrin M. McMahon & Samuel Moyn eds., 2014); Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas, 8 HIST. AND THEORY 3 (1969). On poststucturalism and intellectual history, see Mark 
Poster, The Future According to Foucault: The Archaeology of Knowledge and Intellectual History, in 
MODERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 137 (Dominick LaCapra & Steven L. Kaplan eds., 
1982).  
 15.  See generally DERRIDA AND LAW (Pierre LeGrand ed., 2009); COSTAS DOUZINAS & RONNIE 
WARRINGTON, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW (1991); 
Symposium, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (1990); 
Symposium, Derrida/America: The Present State of America’s Europe, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 529 
(2005). See also Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in 
THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY: THE LANGUAGES OF CRITICISM AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN 
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(appropriately) rendered problematic, legal historians have thrown the baby 
out with the bathwater, pushing the discipline to be ever more historicist, more 
contextual, more contingent,16 albeit more professionally accepted.17 
To be sure, there was much wrong about the breadth of prestructuralist 
historiography, and it remains a curiosity how it managed for as long as it did.18 
 
(Richard Mackey & Eugenio Donato eds., 2007); Philip Lewis, The Post-Structuralist Condition, 12 
DIACRITICS 2 (1982). For a more recent review, see TERRY EAGLETON, THE EVENT OF LITERATURE 
(2012). 
 16.  See generally William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal 
History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (describing the 
downfall of unifying and totalizing visions of American legal history and the subsequent rise of 
contextual approaches). For representative discussions of legal historiography today, see generally 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY—LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ (Daniel Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010); STEPHEN 
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM (2000); Jack 
Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J.L. & HUM. 191 (1999); Christopher Tomlins, 
History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative, Justification, and Explanation, 16 YALE J. L. & HUM. 
323 (2004) [hereinafter Tomlins, Narrative]; G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional 
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002); Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 543 (2011). 
The recent A COMPANION TO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Sally E. Hadden & Alfred L. Brophy 
eds., 2013) is representative of the standard mode. It begins with a selection of chronological overviews 
and then turns to the bulk work, helpfully exploring the disparate histories of particular groups and 
subject areas. The fourth part of the book is dedicated to “legal thought,” though that section is 
similarly disaggregated into discussions of law and literature, critical legal studies, international 
relations, and discrete blocks of time. Recent book-length attempts at a grand telling of law’s history, 
up through the present, are often still illustrative of the dominant twentieth-century functionalist-
historicist approach to legal history. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 
2005); KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR (2d ed. 2009). Functionalist-
historicism, described below, infra notes 86 & 90, asks about how law has responded to shifting social 
needs at a particular moment in time. One might wonder whether the domain of “applied legal history” 
comes closest to the search for contemporary legal thought. Alfred Brophy explains that applied legal 
history is “deeply researched, serious scholarship that is motivated by, engages with, or speaks to 
contemporary issues.” Alfred L. Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal History, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 233, 
233 (2013). But my sense is that it does not. In contrast to the desire to dig beneath topical events in 
order to unearth deeper commonalities, “applied legal history” appears more interested in using history 
to understand current legal and political controversies. As Brophy points out, this sounds quite a lot 
like what is often criticized as “law office history.” Id. at 234. But for Brophy, the new turn to applied 
legal history is more robust and more sharply targeted. Id. For discussion of the “law office history” 
problem, see Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 95–109 (1997); Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 119, 155–58 (1965).  
 17.  See Jessica Lowe, Radicalism’s Legacy: American Legal History Since 1998, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE (forthcoming). 
 18.  I take the decisive blow to have been rendered in Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 100–02 (1984) (outlining the key claims advanced by poststructuralist and 
deconstructionist approaches to legal history) [hereinafter Gordon, Critical Legal Histories]. See 
generally Terrence J. McDonald, Introduction, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1, 6 
(Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996). 
The importance of theorists of the local and contingent operations of power and ideology as 
otherwise as different as Geertz and Foucault; the prominence of such theoretical terms 
(constantly redefined and contested) as hegemony, discourse, and identity, the multiple shifts 
from the global to the local, from the macro to the micro, and from structure to conjuncture 
and event in the distinctive intellectual practices of the era . . . are all both symptomatic and 
constitutive of these developments [in post-structuralist theory]. 
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So, in many respects, the late-twentieth-century wave of critical historicism was 
a good thing.19 But with the vision of the microgrid of faculty expertise that 
followed the critique also came a blindness to our potential to usefully generate 
patterns of argument in so much of our legal language.20 Paralyzed by the new 
habit of seeking to establish discontinuities and ruptures, many legal historians 
turned away from these deeper digs for fear of committing the genuine errors of 
evolutionary functionalist historiography. I think, however, that as these 
patterns and structures have slipped into our disciplinary blind spots, we 
become less likely to get a glimpse of contemporary legal thought. Perhaps like 
you, I’m interested in seeing into these blind spots, but as we seek to do so we 
needn’t follow the old roads back to an outdated evolutionary functionalism, 
with its progress narratives and crass totalizations.21 The way is open back to a 
 
Id. See also PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992).  Robert W. Gordon, 
The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1997). In the view of some, this critical 
historicism now dominates the field of legal historiography. See Kunal Parker, Law “In” and “As” 
History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1790–1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587, 593 (2011).  
A quarter century after the appearance of Gordon’s article, particularly from the perspective 
of legal scholars trained in the humanities and social sciences who have acquired a berth on 
law faculties, the call to contextualize law, to place it “in” history as a way of diminishing its 
autonomy and of showing it to be a species of politics—or social context read as politics—
seems entirely familiar. For historians engaged with the discipline of history, situating law in 
its social-historical context to achieve a variety of effects—to demonstrate its contingency, to 
reveal its politics, to underscore its imbrication in power relations, to hint at the possibility of 
its being remade, and so on and so forth—has been thoroughly normalized. As scholarship 
relentlessly historicizing law pours out, offering us endlessly complex pictures of law’s past 
and pointing to the plurality of missed opportunities in the past (all of which are supposed to 
mirror the open possibilities of the future), one cannot help but experience a sense of 
intellectual exhaustion.  
Id. Discussing Gordon Wood’s anxieties about the popularity of historical scholarship, Christopher 
Tomlins writes: “Wood argues that this is a necessary consequence of history’s continued commitment 
to ‘science’—the historical monograph is analogous to a scientific paper . . . . Specialization, however, 
discourages attempts at comprehensive generalizing narrative.” Christopher Tomlins, Review Essay—
The Consumption of History in the Legal Academy: Science and Synthesis, Perils and Prospects, 61 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 139, 145–46 (2011) (book review). 
 19.  Prestructuralist historiography is admittedly a strange term.  All I mean by it is the designation 
of that mode of legal historiography that preceded, for lack of a better marker, Robert Gordon, 
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981), and in the twentieth century was most 
popularly associated with Willard Hurst. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); see also Carl Landauer, Social 
Science on a Lawyer’s Bookshelf: Willard Hurst’s Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 59 (2000). 
 20.  See Desautels-Stein, Pragmatic Liberalism, supra note 1, at 1051–57.  
 21.  Hayden White’s work has been especially influential on my thinking here. White explains,  
A generally aesthetic attitude is no more intrinsically liberating than a purely cognitive one; in 
fact, it is repressive insofar as it involves a cognitive moment in its elaboration. What is 
required, it would seem, is an aesthetic attitude in which the cultivation of a style takes 
precedence over any curiosity about the true nature of the experience being stylized. A 
liberatory style would be one improvised solely for heightening pleasures on the occasion of 
their possibility but dissolved at the moment of gratification. Any attempt to extend the 
stylization improvised for one occasion to another, any attempt to generalize a style of 
comportment and to make of it a code applicable to all occasions, would represent a slippage 
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structuralist legal history—a way that generates intelligibility not through the 
postmodern elaboration of a never-ending series of social contexts, but through 
the construction of image and style, constrained by and operating through a 
conceptual structure.22 This structure is neither apodictically accountable, nor 
always slipping down the rabbit hole of context-dependent perception. 
Structuralist legal history, something quite other than late-twentieth-century 
“critical legal history,” presents a yet-unexplored way to get to contemporary 
legal thought.23 
But what is structuralist legal history, and how is it better suited to the 
search for contemporary legal thought?24 Why might structuralist historiography 
help get the conversation going in a way that critical legal history has not?  
Unfortunately, in this article I can only hint at what are concededly partial 
answers. But before the hints, a little primer on structuralism. 
II 
STRUCTURALISM 
In the intellectual climate of the 1960s, it was common to analyze social 
practices in linguistic terms.25 This concededly odd posture had been a work in 
 
from an aesthetic into an ethical attitude. 
HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM 139 (1987). See also HAYDEN WHITE, THE FICTION OF 
NARRATIVE (2010); HAYDEN WHITE, FIGURAL REALISM (1999); HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF 
DISCOURSE (1978). For a discussion of White’s work, see generally Symposium, Hayden White: Twenty-
Five Years on, 37 HIST. AND THEORY 143 (1998).  
 22.  See Justin Desautels-Stein, Back in Style, 25 LAW & CRITIQUE 141 (2014). 
 23.  Some are sure to remark, “Really?  Haven’t we already been through this?” See Daniel Ernst, 
The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019, 1032 (1993) (book 
review). My argument is that while it is true, in a sense, that we have been here before, structuralist 
legal history has yet to enjoy its day in the sun.   
 24.  For a while now, intellectual history has been an increasingly problematic term for describing a 
given mode of historiography. See John Diggins, Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The 
Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin, 76 AM. HIST. REV. 99 (1971). In some circles, intellectual history is 
immediately rendered suspect due to its privileging of the ideal over the material. For discussion, see 
THEORY, METHOD AND PRACTICE IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY (Peter Karsten & John 
Modell eds., 1992). But then, of course, we just end up in a debate about the meaning of materiality and 
law’s place in it. See, e.g., E.P. Thompson’s famous attack on Althusser in E.P. THOMPSON, THE 
POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1978). Today, intellectual history is just as much common 
ground for poststructuralists as it is for J.G.A. Pockock’s descendants, thereby rendering the term 
difficult at best, meaningless at worst. For early discussions, see VERNON LOUIS PARRINGTON, MAIN 
CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927); Arthur Lovejoy, Reflections on the History of Ideas, 1 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 3 (1940). Pockock’s famous work here is THE MACHIVALLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). The effort to retool 
intellectual history in response to the materialist critique is well-captured in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (John Higham & Paul K. Conkin eds., 1979). But contemporaneous with this 
effort was the emergence of a poststructuralist commandeering of intellectual history. See David 
Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return of Literature, 94 AM. HIST. REV. 581 (1989). Something of a 
piece with this trajectory was the publication of PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM (1987). For 
discussion, see Dorothy Ross, Afterword, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 704 (1991).  
 25.  See FRANCOIS DOSSE, HISTORY OF STRUCTURALISM, VOLUME I: THE RISING OF THE SIGN, 
1945-1966 45 (1997) (“In order to understand the structuralist paradigm . . . we have to begin with the 
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progress since World War II.26 With Claude Lévi-Strauss at the helm,27 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiotics was taken beyond linguistics to the rituals of 
familial relations, mythmaking, cuisine, and poetry, among other things.28 The 
result was “structuralism.”29 
In the hands of the French intellectual elite, structuralist analyses took a 
given field, say, fashion, and suggested that the style of dress in a particular 
community could be explained as a language system.30 Just as French was 
governed by a deep grammar (langue), scholars like Roland Barthes suggested 
that there was a language of fashion—fashion was spoken through the medium 
 
Saussurean break, since an entire generation read and considered [it] to be the founding moment.”); 
ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY (1979); JOHN STURROCK, 
STRUCTURALISM 6–10 (2003); Douglas Tallack, Introduction, in CRITICAL THEORY: A READER 11, 11 
(Douglas Tallack ed., 1995) (“In the 1960s Saussure’s model of language became paradigmatic for a 
number of important structuralist ventures which sought to analyze as systems of signs fashion, 
advertising, narrative and poetry, and whole cultures . . . .”).  
 26.  To be clear, this account is intended to describe the semiotics of continental philosophy, and 
not the related but distinct strand of thought running through analytic philosophy and beginning with 
Gottlob Frege’s writings. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975). For an 
exchange between the two branches, see Kevin Mulligan, Searle, Derrida, and the Ends of 
Phenomenology, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO SEARLE 261 (Barry Smith ed., 2003); John 
Searle, Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 1 GLYPH  198 (1977). This is a reply to Jacques 
Derrida, Signature Event Context, 1 GLYPH 172 (1977); Derrida replies to Searle's reply in Limited Inc., 
2 GLYPH 162 (1977). See also John Searle, The Word Turned Upside Down, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 27, 
1983, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1983/oct/27/the-word-turned-upside-down/; 
Reply from Mackey and rejoinder from Searle, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/ 
1984/feb/02/an-exchange-on-deconstruction/?pagination=false.   
 27.  See generally CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson 
trans., 1963); CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (Univ. of Chi. Press 1966). 
 28.  FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Wade Baskin trans., Perry 
Meisel & Haun Saussy eds., 2011). See also Richard T. De George & Fernande M. De George, 
Introduction, in THE STRUCTURALISTS: FROM MARX TO LÉVI-STRAUSS xi, xi (Richard T. De George 
& Fernande M. De George eds., 1972) (“Claude Lévi-Strauss is the undisputed high priest.”). 
 29.  Structuralism begins well before the 1960s, depending on how the counting is done. When 
Roman Jakobson coined the term structuralism in 1929, he wrote,  
Were we to comprise the leading idea of present-day science in its most various 
manifestations, we could hardly find a more appropriate designation than structuralism. Any 
set of phenomena examined by contemporary science is treated not as a mechanical 
agglomeration but as a structural whole, and the basic task is to reveal the inner . . . laws of the 
system. 
ROMAN JAKOBSON, Retrospect, in SELECTED WRITINGS 711, 711 (1971). Others draw the field back to 
Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, or even Giambattista Vico, writing in 1725. See TERENCE HAWKES, 
STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS 1 (2003). For another general history of structuralism, see EDITH 
KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM: LÉVI-STRAUSS TO FOUCAULT (1980). Probably the best 
collection of structuralist works is available in STRUCTURALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS, VOL. I–IV 
(Jonathan D. Culler ed., 2006). 
 30.  See Gilles Deleuze, How Do We Recognize Structuralism?, in THE TWO-FOLD THOUGHT OF 
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI: INTERSECTIONS AND ANIMATIONS 251, 261 (Charles J, Strivale ed., 1998) 
(“[T]he first [structuralist] criterion consists of this: the positing of a symbolic order, irreducible to the 
orders of the real and the imaginary, and deeper than them. We do not know at all yet what this 
symbolic element consists of. We can say at least that the corresponding structure has no relationship 
with a sensible form, nor with a figure of the imagination, nor with an intelligible essence.”) 
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of dress.31 And just as French utterances might take a mind-boggling number of 
forms (parole), so too are there many, many ways to dress.32  But structuralism 
was not simply a proxy for the obvious sense of open-endedness apparent in our 
choices to say certain things or wear certain outfits. More importantly, 
structuralism was also an argument about the constraints on what we say, or 
what we wear. These limits took the form of a deep grammar, governing and 
shaping the surface level forms in ways that were almost always invisible to the 
user of the grammar. Structuralists were interested in explaining what appeared 
to be random and highly discretionary social practices as constituted and 
controlled by largely unconscious rule-systems.33 (To get a feel for what 
structuralists meant by the “unconscious,” consider that as you read these 
sentences or form your own, you don’t sweat the complex rules of English 
grammar, even though you might be hardly conscious of the details of that rule-
system.) 
If the structuralist thesis is strange, its career was even stranger. Raging onto 
the French intellectual scene, it was fizzling by the 1970s.34 Confronted with 
questions about the possibility of accurately identifying such structures, the 
postulated differences between “depth” and “surface,” the role of the 
structuralist in discovering the structure (was he in the structure, too?), and the 
dubious existence of a transcendent structure totalizing all of social relations, 
 
 31.  See Jonathan Culler, Introduction, in STRUCTURALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS, supra note 29, 
at 3 [hereinafter Culler, Introduction]. 
To investigate neckties, for instance, structuralism would attempt to reconstruct (a) the 
structure of neckties themselves (the oppositions—wide/narrow, loud/subdued—that enable 
different sorts of neckties to bear different meanings for members of a culture) and (b) the 
underlying ‘vestimentary’ structures or system of a given culture (how do neckties relate to 
other items of clothing and the wearing of neckties to other socially-coded actions?). 
Id. See also ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM (Matthew Ward & Richard Harris trans., 
1983). 
 32.  This is Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole. Langue refers to the fundamental 
rules of syntax shaping the contours and boundaries of the linguistic structure. As Saussure explained, 
the langue represents “the whole set of linguistic habits which allow an individual to understand and be 
understood.” SAUSSURE, supra note 25, at 77. The langue is consequently social in nature, and 
determinate in scope. The langue is a system of constraints operating equally on each language speaker. 
Its contents are fixed and closed, and in the context of the system, universal. Id. at 76. In contrast is 
parole, which refers to the open, arbitrary, and individually created speech-acts made in light of the 
deep structure of the langue. Id. Thus, where langue is unconscious and out of sight, parole is 
intentional and visible. Where langue is syntax, parole is utterance. Where langue represents a field of 
coercion, parole is free. Where parole is apparent and everywhere, langue is only discoverable through 
an analysis of the common qualities demonstrable in parole. Id. at 73–77. 
 33.  See Culler, Introduction, supra note 29, at 3. (“Structuralism thus involves the attempt to spell 
out, explicitly, what members of a culture know without knowing it: the structures that underlie cultural 
practice, and make possible, for instance, people’s judgments about what is ordinary, strange, 
meaningful, or meaningless.”) 
 34.  See PETER CAWS, STRUCTURALISM: THE ART OF THE INTELLIGIBLE 2 (1988) (“The career of 
the structuralist movement . . . was meteoric: a brilliant streak followed by relative extinction. It 
managed to pass to pass from novelty to fashion to cliché in a very few years, with hardly any interval of 
mature reflection .”) 
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structuralism shriveled.35 Lévi-Strauss’ ideas encountered what came to be 
known as “poststructuralism” and “deconstruction,” associated with the 
philosopher Jacques Derrida, and structuralism suffered for it.36 Referring to 
some of the most famous structuralists, the literary theorist Terry Eagleton 
commented, “Fate pushed Roland Barthes under a Parisian laundry van, and 
afflicted Michel Foucault with [AIDS]. It dispatched Lacan, Williams, and 
Bourdieu, and banished Louis Althusser to a psychiatric hospital for the murder 
of his wife. It seemed that God was not a structuralist.”37 
Putting divine intervention aside for now, at the moment when French 
structuralism was retreating, it found its way to American law schools, or at 
least, it arrived at Harvard in the mid-1970s.38 In the hands of scholars working 
in what I call the Harvard School of legal structuralism, French structuralism 
counseled a semiotic approach to legal history just as others had taken a 
semiotic approach to anthropology and literature.39 The idea here was that law 
ought to be understood as a language-system, where the forms of lexical 
argument are governed by a deep grammar.40 In this first generation of legal 
 
 35.  Representative discussions are found in EVE TAYLOR BANNET, STRUCTURALISM AND THE 
LOGIC OF DISSENT (1989) and MARK POSTER, CRITICAL THEORY AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM (1989). 
It is common to see Roland Barthes’s S/Z: AN ESSAY (Richard Miller trans., 1975) as a transition piece 
from structuralism to poststructuralism. See, e.g., Bjørnar Olsen, Roland Barthes: From Sign to Text, in 
READING MATERIAL CULTURE 163, 165 (Christopher Tilley ed., 1990) (“What is considered as his 
shift from structuralism to poststructuralism denotes the third phase [in Barthes’ work], of which S/Z is 
regarded as diagnostic. This shift was clearly influenced by Tel Quel textualism and the writings of 
Derrida and Kristeva.”). But as I argue, Barthes and Foucault are better understood as refining 
structuralism, and not going post structuralism. See also JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: 
THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 26 (1982). 
And Barthes’ best-known work, S/Z, is very difficult to classify, not because it avoids the 
issues on which a distinction between structuralism and post-structuralism is generally based 
but because it seems to adopt both modes with a vengeance, as though unaware that they are 
supposed to be radically different movements. 
Id. 
 36.  For early examples, see HAROLD BLOOM ET AL, DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM (1979); 
JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976); Jonathan 
Culler, Jacques Derrida, in STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE 154 (John Sturrock ed., 1979); J. Hillis Miller, 
Stevens’ Rock and Criticism as Cure, II, 30 GA. REV. 330 (1976). 
 37.  TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER THEORY 1 (2003). 
 38.  The understanding of structuralism’s trajectory in France as opposed to its career in the 
United States has been plagued by the American tendency to view poststructuralism as the end of 
structuralism, rather than, at least as I see it, a helpful qualification. See also Culler, Introduction, supra 
note 29, at 4. 
 39.  In a forthcoming work, I focus on Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, Gerald Frug, and David 
Kennedy as representative of the various styles of legal structuralism being developed at Harvard Law 
School in the 1970s and early 1980s. JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN, THE PROBLEM WITH PRAGMATISM: A 
STRUCTURALIST HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
 40.  See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 8 (1975) (“Problems, 
methods, and experience constitute the ‘deep structure’ of the thought. This ‘deep structure’ allows 
room for a variety of philosophical positions, depending on which part of the underlying experience is 
illuminated and which chain of problems pursued. But the number of these positions is limited, and 
their relationship to each other is determined by their place within the larger system.”); Duncan 
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structuralism, that deep grammar was often labeled “liberal legalism.”41 But just 
as French structuralism declined in the face of deconstructionism, so too would 
American legal structuralism wither in the coming confrontation with 
poststructuralist legal theory.42 Using Derridean language, James Boyle’s 
criticism from 1985 was illustrative of the mood: 
Duncan Kennedy’s account of the fundamental contradiction [offers] a picture of 
“what went on” that draws on the participant’s awareness and yet transcends it. By 
uncovering “what is really going on,” the structuralist strand in critical legal studies 
tries to expose the constraining quality of the structures of everyday life, which are 
embedded in legal decisions, standard arguments, or in the unproblematic 
assumptions on which a discussion is based . . . . By offering a convincing account of 
knowledge, power, and life that is largely independent of the “intentionally acting 
subject,” [Kennedy’s structuralism] seems to undermine the central role that the 
subjectivist strand has held in the Western epistemological and political 
tradition. Each strand, in other words, both contradicts and relies on the other. Each 
 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan 
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979). There obviously 
has been much debate about whether these structures were believed to be transcendent and universal 
by proponents of the Harvard School.  Unger’s discussion of “structure as hypothesis” opposed to 
“structure as science” is helpful.   
In the plastic or narrative work of art, universality of meaning is often achieved not through 
abstraction from the particularity of individual things but by the very richness with which this 
particularity is represented. The work fails either when it lacks a general significance or when 
it stands for general ideas and ideals not fully expressed in the work itself but left in a formal, 
abstract state. In the first case, art becomes frivolous; in the second, didactic. But in the great 
work of art men are able to recognize that something is being shown that has a broad and 
therefore lasting significance and illuminates hidden features of many situations. This 
something, the universal, cannot be reduced to abstract propositions. It is embodied in 
expressions . . . ; it can be rediscovered elsewhere. 
UNGER, supra note 40, at 144. 
 41.  See, e.g., Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); David 
Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN YEARBOOK INT’L L. 353 (1980). In 
A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIÈCLE] 113–19 (1997), Duncan Kennedy distinguished 
between “Liberalism,” “liberalism,” and “conservatism,” using “liberal legalism” as a reference to the 
reflection of legal thinking in the context of “post-realist” “liberalism,” with a small l. This is consistent 
with LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1998). My discussion of 
“liberal legalism,” as opposed to Kalman’s designation “legal liberalism,” is much more than a proxy 
for welfare-state-era liberal politics, and is closer to Kennedy liberalism with a capital L. It is a 
liberalism that begins in the seventeenth century, triumphs in the nineteenth, is chastened and 
transformed in the twentieth, and, in my view, begins an intense affair with pragmatism in the twenty-
first. My understanding of liberal legalism is worked out in Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal 
Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2012); Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 
BUFF. L. REV. 387 (2012). 
 42.  There is a sizable literature here. A few well-known examples include James Boyle, The 
Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); 
Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies in America, 
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389 (1993); Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 
(1984); David Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, in CRITICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 353 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek eds., 1989); 
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Joan C. Williams, Critical 
Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 
(1987). 
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contains the dangerous supplement, the trace, of its opposite.43 
III 
HISTORICISM 
In many respects, I don’t believe that the Harvard School was guilty of the 
sins attributed to it by poststructuralist legal scholars.  But, we might wonder, if 
the structuralists weren’t really trying to give a foundational account of “what 
went on,” why did their cause never get a second hearing? In part, the collapse 
of legal structuralism had much to do with the shifted orientation of the 
structuralists themselves,44 along with their allies. Robert Gordon’s Critical 
Legal Histories is a case in point.45 Gordon is more of an intellectual historian 
than a practitioner of legal structuralism, though his famous attack on 
prestructuralist legal historiography was very much in support of the Harvard 
School. Nevertheless, rather than paving the way towards a new mode of 
structuralist legal history, that article, curiously, helped shut it down. In other 
words, despite its interest in making room for a new structuralist historiography, 
truly fantastic articles like Critical Legal Histories nevertheless helped generate 
a disciplinary terrain in which it has become increasingly difficult to see 
contemporary legal thought as anything but a collection of “beauteous 
fragments.” 
To see how poststructuralist historicism put legal historians off-sides the 
question of contemporary legal thought,46 it is helpful to put Gordon’s article in 
a very short history of history writing.47 In the historiographical mode G. 
Edward White has called prehistoricism, late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-
century historians saw the past as operating in a smooth and continuous line 
culminating in the present.48 When these historians identified what they 
 
 43.  Boyle, The Politics of Reason, supra note 42, at 743–44. For further discussion, see GARY 
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 115 
(1995). 
 44.  Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, Gerald Frug, and David Kennedy, all in one way or 
another, sought to chasten their own views of legal structuralism in the 1980s and 90s. Of the four, 
David Kennedy’s reversal was the most severe. See David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism, and 
Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209 (1986).  
 45.  Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). I think this article is a 
helpful piece to focus on due to its extremely accessible status. See generally Lowe, supra note 17. See 
also Hendrik Hartog, Introduction to Symposium on “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 LAW & SOC. INQ. 
147, 148 (2012) (“‘Critical Legal Histories’ . . . must be there as a part of a student’s socialization into 
our discipline—and I suspect it will continue to remain so for years to come.”). 
 46.  For a different and interesting version of the story, see generally Lowe, supra note 17. 
 47.  For ease of presentation, this brief summary relies heavily on two recent treatments of the 
issue: White, Arrival, supra note 16, and Rabban, supra note 6. 
 48.  See GEORG IGGERS, THE GERMAN CONCEPTION OF HISTORY: THE NATIONAL TRADITION 
OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT FROM HERDER TO THE PRESENT (1968) (reflecting on the emergence of 
German historicism and its relevance here); see also Roger Berkowitz, From Justice to Justification: An 
Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 611 (2011); Howard Schweber, The 
Science of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal 
Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421 (1999).  
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believed to be natural law principles of past experience, they saw these same 
natural laws governing the politics of their own day.49 The past was not, as it 
would later become fashionable to say, a foreign country;50 the past was the 
present, only older, premised on the existence of universal principles fashioning 
the various forms of human life.51 The principles were static, originating in God 
or Nature, and manifested in endless repetitions of “birth, decay, and 
renewal.”52 As a result, prehistoricist scholars expected that the lives of their 
children would unfold in much the way that life had been lived by their 
parents.53 
In contrast with this prehistoricist view of a static past-into-present 
continuum, evolutionary historicism emerged among late-nineteenth-century 
U.S. historians and lawyers in the context of a repudiation of prehistoricist 
“presentism.”54 This repudiation was partially premised on new conceptions of 
time itself, wherein the past was seen as segmented from the present.55 The 
historian’s task was no longer directed at the identification of time’s endless 
repetitions, but was now about telling the truth about that past—about what 
had really happened—rather than commandeering the past into the service of 
particular policy briefs about the present.56 This new historicism was also fueled 
by the emergence of the American social sciences and the application of the 
scientific method to human affairs.57 In this context, the past increasingly 
became irrelevant to social studies; it was the present that was the target of the 
modern social scientist, asking how empiricism could make for a better world, 
right now.58 For this generation of social scientists working before World War I, 
 
 49.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 499. See also Robert Gordon, Recent Trends in Legal 
Historiography, 69 LAW LIBR. J. 462, 462 (1976). He argued that, on the legal side at this time,  
[I]t did not much matter whether a legal historian believed that the law gurgled spontaneously 
upwards from the culture and deposited itself in the judgments of courts, or was carefully 
extracted from the culture by black-robed legal scientists. Separately or in combination, both 
ideas led to the same conclusion, that the only materials one needed to consult for the study of 
legal history were legal materials, the formal, internal products of the legal system. 
Id. 
 50.  L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN (1953).  
 51.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 505. 
 52.  Id. at 499, 501. 
 53.  Id. See also DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 8–9 (1992). 
 54.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 506. See also Christopher Tomlins, Review Essay-The 
Consumption of History in the Legal Academy: Science and Synthesis, Perils and Prospects, 61 J.L. & 
EDUC. 139, 141 (2011) (“The first generation of professional historians attempted to displace the 
preceding generation of patrician amateurs by constructing ‘scientific’ empirical history (to go along 
with legal science, political science, and so on). They led the discipline in an arid landscape of rigid 
factualism, evolutionist in general perspective but suspicious of any more pointed form of causality.”). 
 55.  Tomlins, Narrative, supra note 16, at 332. 
 56.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 509–10. 
 57.  The story is complicated to the extent White and Ross both show how early stages in the 
development of the social sciences were committed to prehistoricism. See Ross, Origins, supra note 53, 
at 64–88; White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 504–05.  
 58.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 506. 
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history was becoming beside the point, if not an obstacle for the new 
empiricist.59 Thus, late nineteenth century historians found themselves between 
a rock and a hard place: the rock being presentist beliefs in transcendent and 
timeless custom they wanted to reject;60 the hard place being the apparent 
irrelevance of the past for modern social science that seemed difficult to avoid.61 
The answer was the plugging of evolutionary theory into the new 
historicism.62 In this light, the past was not relevant to the present due to a belief 
that the two domains were somehow governed by the same customs, as in the 
natural law thinking of the prehistoricists; the past was relevant because it was 
in the acorn of past times that the growing oak of the present found its origins.63 
As White has put it, evolutionary theory filled the position for historicists that 
providence had filled for the prehistoricists.64 Of course, at one level, the rules 
constituting the acorn and the tree were at odds—but this was precisely the 
point. History changes constantly over time, and the rules making sense of 
change similarly evolve as well.65 But history progresses, slowly accumulating its 
received wisdoms through trial and error, pushing humanity further and further 
still towards a better contemporary,66 even though the ultimate principles—
those ultimates governing both the acorn and the tree—might in some sense be 
seen as timeless.67 Thus, historicists argued with their social science 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Cf. Rabban, supra note 6, at 326. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 511. 
Drawing upon a historicist conception of historical change and the methodology of Darwinist 
evolutionary science, [historicists] recharacterized the narrative of history as a continuous 
progression of change, which, on careful investigation, could be made into the progressive 
accumulation and refinement of historical truth. The collective derivation of that truth, 
however, required that the historian investigator assume the detached posture of the scientific 
observer. It required that historians be objective. 
Id. The well-known debates between advocates of “consensus history” and “progressive history” fall in 
this space. For representative discussions, see generally CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE 
RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1927); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: 
AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955); RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1973); OSCAR 
HANDLIN & MARY HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSSETS, 1774–1861 (1947). 
 63.  Of course, this mode of making the past relevant by accommodating functionalist historicism 
wasn’t immune from historicist critique. See JOHN REID, 1966: Legal History, in THE LITERATURE OF 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, at 101–02; Gordon, Historicism, supra note 19. 
 64.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 510–11. 
 65.  See, e.g., W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST 
MANIFESTO (1991). 
 66.  Rabban, supra note 6, at 327–28; White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 511. 
 67.  To the extent whiffs of “timelessness” appear in progress narratives, I think all we are seeing is 
the same paradox identified in Pocock’s discussion of the common law. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30–38 (1987). See also Paulo Barrozo, The Great 
Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in Modern Law, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1–2, 2015 at 
235.  
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contemporaries, that the past was relevant to the work of the political scientist 
for the same reason that evolutionary biology was relevant to the biologist: We 
can better understand our present condition by reflecting on the manner in 
which we have arrived, and this understanding ought to be scientifically 
objective.68 That is, we can understand the present in virtue of its inevitable and 
objectively ascertainable difference with the past—not its sameness.69 
Arguably, evolutionary historicism ruled the discipline for one hundred 
years, from roughly 1870 to 1970.70 As one might expect, by the 1970s, the 
distinction between past and present common to all evolutionary historicists, 
and its affiliation with the canon of objective historical excavation, was at the 
 
 68.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 512.  
 69.  See generally VISION AND METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY (Theda Skocpol ed., 1984). 
 70.  In a well-known article from 1975, Robert Gordon suggested (while not explicitly using the 
term) that evolutionary historicism was an aspect of classical legal thought, beginning around 1880. 
Robert Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal 
Historiography, 10 LAW & SOC. REV. 9, 12 (1975). Gordon explained that, in classical legal thought, 
evolutionary historicism had an “internal” dimension to it, such that the evolution of law was strictly 
separate from any social contexts. Evolutionary historicism, in this view, was formalistic due to its 
commitment to the idea that legal history was “only the history of past state commands, rather than the 
history of an entire culture.” Id. at 20. In contrast, and in what I call “modern legal thought,” 
evolutionary historicism took on an external dimension.  In this modern shift, legal historians 
investigated nonlegal materials and social contexts, and believed that interdisciplinary approaches to 
legal history were more empirically accurate. Id. at 33–34. David Rabban has more recently argued, 
however, that this division between an internal historiography belonging to classical legal thought and 
an external historiography for modern legal thought is misleading, if not just wrong. Rabban, supra 
note 6, at 512–19. See also Parker, supra note 18. I think Rabban is right to argue that evolutionary 
historicism is a mode of historiography common to both the proponents of classical and modern legal 
thought alike—but it is a mistake to gloss over how evolutionary historicism manifests differently 
depending on whether we look at in the classical or modern styles. As Rabban explains it, late-
nineteenth-century evolutionary historicism included beliefs in the rightness of looking at law as 
progressively responding to changing social needs, often in the light of ideas about racial superiority; 
the rightness of custom over regulation; the rightness judicial navigation of an apolitical common law 
over the political work of legislators; and the rightness of postbellum individualism as expressed in late 
nineteenth century developments in property, contract, and tort law. Rabban, supra note 6, at 325–80. 
These ideas, all in orbit around beliefs in a classic liberal public–private distinction, are the ideas of 
classical legal thought. See, e.g., Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 7, at 25–37.  In modern legal 
thought, evolutionary legal thought merged with the functionalist jurisprudence, which recommended 
to the jurist a course of action in which many of the classical premises were reversed.  Race science 
increasingly took a back seat as questions piled up about the veracity of late nineteenth century 
narratives about so-called “Teutonic origins;” the customary aspects of the common law were seen as 
political and ideological; legislation becomes highly favored as a technique for solving society’s 
problems; “social” conceptions of the private law took on new significance over and against 
“individualist” conceptions; the answers to concrete legal disputes could be determined through the 
judge’s investigation of the social purposes meant to be realized by a particular rule, rather than the 
true principles disclosed by a progressively developing set of customs. See generally, Desautels-Stein, 
Race as a Legal Concept, supra note 41; Desautels-Stein, Pragmatic Liberalism, supra note 1, at 1066–
73. In the context of legal historiography, functionalism directed the work of legal historians to 
understand changes in the legal system as a series of responses to preexisting social needs and interests 
that weren’t necessarily progressive, directed by “common sense” or the law of nature, or promoted by 
racial destiny. Legal history, on this modern view, could still be “objective” just as the classical 
purveyors of evolutionary historicism believed, though it was also “contingent”—a word with less 
purchase in the context of classical legal thought. Rabban, supra note 6, at 326–27. 
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center of deconstructionist and poststructuralist critique.71 This was troubling, 
since historians required a foothold in time in order to pinpoint the right past 
into which the right present had evolved. But if it was becoming too challenging 
to objectively speak of past and present, historicism seemed lost. Drawing on 
Peter Novick’s work, White explained: 
Post–World War II scholars had an enhanced sense of the cultural homogeneity of 
American civilization; America was modern, democratic, antitotalitarian, capitalist, 
and largely free from ideological polarization. It was a vivid “present,” to be 
juxtaposed against or to obliterate a quite different “past.” But by the early 1980s  . . . 
scholars saw their present as confused, polarized, unstable. As a clear sense of the late 
twentieth century “present” vanished, the objectivity canon virtually collapsed as a 
central professional ideology for late twentieth century historians.72 
It is in the midst of this collapse of the past–present distinction, and along 
with it evolutionary historicism, that I now want to focus on Gordon’s Critical 
Legal Histories.73 In that article, Gordon famously crushed evolutionary 
historicism, both as it manifested itself both in classical and modern legal 
thought.74 After the crushing was complete, Gordon then suggested that the way 
was open for a new mode of postobjectivist historiography—a mode that I 
interchangeably refer to as “critical historicism” (Gordon’s phrase) and 
“poststructuralist historicism.”75 Gordon explained that the new postobjectivist 
historiography involved three moves. The first move blurred the distinction 
between law and society that was so fundamental for modern evolutionary 
historicists, like Willard Hurst.76 These historians sought to understand how law 
had changed over time in response to the basic conditions of material life by 
 
 71.  In the context of general historiography, see Novick, supra note 24, at 628. For a 
representative critique in law, see Mark Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A 
Critical Review of Friedman’s ‘A History of American Law,’ 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81, 82–83 (1977). 
 [Tushnet’s review] develops two criticisms of Professor Friedman’s pluralist, materialist 
perspective. First, by taking as settled that the legal order is a faithful mirror of the social and 
economic order, Professor Friedman ignores the influence of autonomy on the legal 
order…Second, by focusing exclusively on ‘those who call the tune,’ he ignores the ideological 
functions of the legal order, as a means of persuading both oppressor and oppressed that their 
conditions are just. 
Id. See also Christopher Tomlins, The Strait Gate: The Past, History, and Legal Scholarship, 11 LAW, 
CULTURE, & HUMAN. 12 (2009) (“Past, present, and future do not compose a natural order: their 
lineage is an artefact of human invention. The moment at which we live, the moment of now, is 
surrounded and infused by all that has been, a spectral murmur indifferent to time passing that is our 
constant companion.”). 
 72.  White, Arrival, supra note 16, at 611–12. 
 73.  See Gordon, Historicism, supra note 63, at 1044 (“[t]he Progressive amalgam’s long 
domination over the organization of scholarly thinking about law is breaking up, and nothing 
comparable is in prospect to replace it. Legal scholars can still be found who write in all the traditional 
responsive modes, but no new amalgam seems to be crystallizing.”); Gordon, Recent Trends, supra note 
49, at 466 (“We used to think there were two realms: the realm of law and the realm of social context. 
On closer inspection ‘law’ seems to dissolve and merge into context; we have been in the swamp all 
along without even knowing it.”). 
 74.  Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 18, at 71. 
 75.  Id. at 102. 
 76.  Id. 
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identifying the essential “needs” of society and the powerful interests that had a 
hand in shaping those needs.77 They then sought to locate the many ways in 
which these social threads unpacked in any given legal system, though without 
reference to a necessary progress narrative: how had legal rules emerged in 
response to social needs and practices, however unfair? For Gordon, the new 
critical historiography rejected this distinction between a prelegal social realm 
and a legal order somehow directed by these more “fundamental” social forces. 
For Gordon’s new legal historians, society was just as much legally constructed 
as the other way around.78 The point, from here on out, would be to reject stale, 
functionalist depictions of law as society’s everlasting lady-in-waiting, and to do 
this one needed to recognize that “law and society are inextricably mixed.”79 
The second move pushed this idea further. Gordon explained that, on the 
way towards critical historicism, one had to accept not only the mutually 
constitutive nature of law-in-society but also a prioritization of law’s role in the 
construction of society.80 It was not precisely clear in the article why Gordon 
privileged law’s role in this way, particularly as it followed the seeming 
counterpoint that law and society were “inextricably mixed.” Probably as a 
result, this emphasis on law’s constitutive role in the social, which necessarily 
came at the expense of the social role in constituting law,81 was somewhat ill-
formed.82 Gordon seemed anxious about the point, explaining that the critic 
“takes each event as situated not on a single developmental path but on 
multiple trajectories of possibility, the path actually chosen being chosen not 
because it had to be but because the people pushing for alternatives were 
 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. at 103. 
Yet, in practice, it is just about impossible to describe any set of “basic” social practices 
without describing the legal relations among the people involved—legal relations that don’t 
simply condition how the people relate to each other but to an important extent define the 
constitutive terms of the relationship . . . . 
Id. 
 79.  Id. at 107. 
 80.  See id. at 111. 
In short, the legal forms we use set limits on what we can imagine as practical options: Our 
desires and plans tend to be shaped out of the limited stock of forms available to us: The 
forms thus condition not just our power to get what we want but what we want (or think we 
can get) itself.  
Id. But as Gordon explained recently, his focus here was mostly on legal structuralism, and he had not 
intended on suggesting that all forms of critical historiography would include these three elements. See 
Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories Revisited, 37 LAW & SOC. INQ. 200, 205 (2012) (“All I was 
trying to do was to explain what a particular kind of critical legal history—the work pioneered by 
Duncan Kennedy and his circle on the history of contradictions in liberal legal thought—was all about 
and why it was worth doing. Kennedy’s work had struck me and many others reading it for the first 
time as shockingly, brilliantly enlightening, and it made me at least reevaluate my prejudice going in 
that doctrine was mostly a sideshow.”).  
 81.  See Christopher Tomlins, What is Left, supra note 12, at 160 (“Gordon’s destruction of 
evolutionary functionalism, however, had taken the matter a long step further by leaving little basis for 
a legal history that was not the history of doctrine.”). 
 82.  Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 18, at 112. 
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weaker and lost out in the struggle . . . .”83  
But this shaky emphasis on law’s constitutive role in the social slid quickly 
towards a more reliable and trendier third move: “indeterminacy located in 
contradiction.”84 That is, while the new critical historian might focus on law’s 
role in determining social needs, rather than the other way around, one must be 
reminded that “law” never means any one thing. Borrowing from Duncan 
Kennedy’s analysis of Blackstone’s Commentaries, Gordon explained that this 
deep sense of law’s indeterminacy was grounded in a fundamental contradiction 
between “our need for others and our fear of them.”85 Thus, the new critical 
historiography was committed to exploring reality’s astonishingly complex 
blending of law in the political, emphasizing law’s role in what was nevertheless 
conceded as a state of mutual constitution, and elaborating law’s endlessly 
indeterminate, albeit constitutive, social life. 
The best example of the new critical historiography, Gordon concluded, was 
legal structuralism.86 This returns us to the point from above: Gordon was 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 114. 
 85.  See id. (“This indeterminacy exists because legal rules derive from structures of thought, the 
collective constructs of many minds, that are fundamentally contradictory.”). 
 86.  See id. at 116–17 (tagging legal structuralism as “surely the most distinctive critical 
contribution,” calling it “legal historiography as the intellectual history of the rise and fall of paradigm 
structures of thought designed to mediate contradictions.”). And to be clear, this was Duncan 
Kennedy’s structuralism, not that belonging to Morton Horwitz. For Gordon, Horwitz broke with much 
of the prior work in functionalist-historicist legal history. Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His 
Critics: A Conflict of Narratives, 37 TULSA L. REV. 915, 921 (2002). But unlike the version of critical 
historiography Gordon described in 1984, Gordon understood Horwitz to have launched an argument 
about law’s determinate (and constitutive) relation with society.  
This commitment led [Horwitz] to his sharpest point of disagreement with colleagues in 
Critical Legal Studies, who were disposed to argue that the association of any given set of 
legal doctrines or principles methods (sic) with legal-political outcomes was never anything 
but contingent, because types of legal argument could be ‘flipped’ so as to be turned to any 
imaginable purpose. No, Horwitz said: at any given time, legal-argument types . . . tend to 
favor privilege, have an inbuilt ‘tilt’ towards particular outcomes and not others. 
Id. at 926. Of course, separating Horwitz from the final category of critical legal history discussed at the 
end of Gordon’s article hardly means that the book was neither important nor new. As Wythe Holt 
wrote in a review, “Horwitz has shattered the grip of conventional legal history on the past, making it 
now impossible for the old apolitical, deterministic or idealistic categories to see so powerful, so 
convincing, or so useful . . . Horwitz has opened a whole new universe for us, the real universe of the 
past and the present.” Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History, 
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 667–68 (1982). In contrast, however, Chris Tomlins has argued that 
although Transformations I was certainly influential, it is a mistake to read the book as having wrought 
a break in the metanarrative of twentieth-century functionalist historicism: 
Horwitz’ withering appraisal of outcomes was highly influential, and of course, his 
unapologetic attribution of an instrumental role to law in crafting those outcomes was highly 
controversial. But American legal historiography’s metanarrative remained essentially 
unaltered . . . Now certainly this outcome may well have been the product of conscious choice. 
Historians in the 1980s and 1990s were deeply suspicious of metanarrative, particularly its 
potential to confine the imagination within interpretive structures unfriendly to particular 
modes of inquiry, or particular subjects. One may prefer a history without metanarrative; 
piecemeal pluralism may indeed be the better row to hoe. 
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hardly interested in debunking legal structuralism. So what happened? The crux 
of the problem, and the reason structuralist legal history fell away as critical 
legal history took off, was the confusing relation between law’s constitutive role 
in society and the apparent inability of law to constitute anything if it was really 
so indeterminate. When adherents of the Harvard School claimed that law was 
political, the point was not to merely reenact the legal realist attack on classical 
legal thought.87 Instead, to claim that law was political was to stress the nature of 
argumentative patterns and the often-arbitrary nature of the legal claims 
swimming in those patterns. But, and this is crucial, for the structuralists the 
seemingly unconstrained nature of legal argument is highly disciplined by the 
system’s langue. That is, for legal structuralists, and unlike for legal realists, the 
claim “law is politics” makes no sense when it is severed from the formal 
constraints provided by the legal grammar. “Indeterminacy rooted in 
contradiction” just wasn’t the right way to present the idea; “structured 
indeterminacy,” with its double nod in the directions of langue and parole, is 
much closer. 
But in Gordon’s telling, this holism—the unity threading lexical arguments 
and grammatical rules together in a “structured indeterminacy”—was missed 
entirely. To be sure, the content was there. But over the course of the 
discussion, the three moves were articulated in the form of a checklist instead of 
in the form of a more organic structure of legal argument. What’s more, the 
important emphasis on the grammar constraining indeterminacy in legal 
structuralism was articulated instead as “law’s constitutive role in society.” In a 
way, Gordon’s choice to frame the point in this way made a lot of sense;88 but 
without also hammering the way in which law itself was deeply structured, the 
reader was left without much understanding of how that phrase could have any 
real meaning since law itself was—apparently—endlessly indeterminate. 
The consequence of framing the elements in this way was dramatic. In the 
years that followed, Gordon’s stress on law’s constitutive role in politics came to 
be seen as out of step with the general sway of poststructuralist thinking.89 At 
 
Christopher Tomlins, American Legal History in Retrospect and Prospect: Reflections on the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of Morton Horwitz’s Transformation of American Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
1135, 1142 (2003). 
 87.  For an interesting account of what indeterminacy meant for Jerome Frank, see Charles 
Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1127 (2010). 
 88.  See, e.g., Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS 123 (1979) (discussing a constitutive 
theory of law). 
 89.  The problem here is the same problem other critics had with Duncan Kennedy’s espousal of 
“non-causality” in Blackstone’s Commentaries. Kennedy had explained that “what I have to say is 
descriptive, and descriptive only of thought. It means ignoring the question of what brings a legal 
consciousness into being, what causes it to change, and what effect it has on the actions of those who 
live in it.” Kennedy, Blackstone, supra note 40, at 220. David Trubek’s reaction: “If Kennedy omits any 
discussion of the effects of legal consciousness in a 173-page article on Blackstone’s legal thought, how 
confidant can he be that his method bears any relationship to his political intent?” David Trubek, 
Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 612 (1984). Kennedy 
was not Trubek’s only target; this was a problem for all of legal structuralism. Until it could show how 
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the same time, the first and third steps merged, making room for the view of 
critical legal history that would follow.90 The first move—Gordon’s critique of 
evolutionary historicism, along with the attendant blurring of law and society 
and the complex and contingent dynamics inherent in that relationship—lined 
up nicely with the argument for legal indeterminacy. “Indeterminacy,” after all, 
seemed to bear a family resemblance to concepts like “complexity” and 
“contingency.” In this posture, critical legal history was primed for its new 
mission: finding the traces of the ebb and flow of a rootless, unstructured 
discursivity.91 The cumbersome notion of law’s constitutive role in society, along 
with talk of the “fundamental contradiction,” was easily detached from the 
broader program.92 Not only was it unclear why these “tin cans”93 had been 
 
legal structures actually affected what went on in society, why would anyone care to read a complicated 
analysis of Blackstone’s Commentaries? Trubek concluded, “This is a challenge that CLS must meet. 
Until we can produce convincing maps of the relationships between elite ideological production, the 
social definition of meaning, and the history of social relations, we will not be able to sustain the claims 
made for Critical studies.” Id. Focusing more on Gordon, Jack Schlegel has offered a similar critique: 
Bob’s choice to retain to the end the assumption that a functionalist account of law must 
assert a positivist’s necessary relationship between need and response was troubling because it 
relegated those CLS scholars who saw a world filled with contingent functional responses to 
the land of not sufficiently thorough, i.e., partial, instrumentalist critiques, to a building away 
from the main house as it were. This choice engendered a certain amount of hard feelings 
among scholars who saw things this way—not a good result in a group that, although 
portrayed in the law school world, and eventually the national press, as an advancing horde, 
was in fact quite small. Moreover, a defense of the constitutive role of legal norms in social 
life, and so of the kind of doctrinal scholarship that Bob wished to trumpet, did not require 
any particular resolution of the question of law’s functionality. Logically, law might have been 
constitutive and necessarily functional, constitutive and not necessarily functional, or 
constitutive and not functional at all. The claim for constitutiveness did not rise or fall based 
on the position taken with respect to the functionality of law’s response to social life. Perhaps 
the argument for constitutiveness was cleaner, and so easier to make, from the assumption 
that functionality assumed necessity. But, beyond such considerations, it is hard to see why 
those CLS adherents who didn’t see things that way needed to be relegated to the out 
buildings. 
John Henry Schlegel, CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question, 58 ALA. L. REV. 967, 971 (2007). 
 90.  It is easy to miss the point here. It is not that legal historians and law and society people did 
not care about law’s role in constituting the social. They cared about it a great deal. Thus, by saying it 
was the first and third moves that took off, leaving the second behind, this is not meant to suggest that 
the new approach entailed a privileging of the social over the legal. That, after all, was the modus 
operandi of the functionalist historicist. Rather the point to focus on is that the whole idea of 
privileging was rendered suspect after poststructuralist historicism took hold. Law and society were 
mutually constitutive, and so it made sense to spend time looking at both sides, but it did not made 
sense prioritizing one side over the other. To do so would miss the true complexity of the real. See, e.g., 
HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1999). 
 91.  See, e.g., MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES (2005); GUYORA BINDER AND ROBERT 
WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000). 
 92.  See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal 
Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 935 (1988). 
Scholarly talk of models or paradigms or fundamental contradictions becomes vulnerable . . . . 
And the possibility of isolating any particular split for discussion begins to seem naive. It no 
longer seems possible to trace the ostensible incoherence of liberal legalism to a fundamental 
contradiction such as self/other or public/private. 
Id. 
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there in the first place, but it was also becomingly evident that such positions 
were deeply problematic for their “totalizing” view of law’s discursive origins.94 
The idea of structuralist legal history, lashed at the waist to those tin cans, sunk 
out of sight. 
IV 
STRUCTURALIST LEGAL HISTORIES 
But now let us imagine that the recent history of legal historiography had 
taken a different turn, and that Gordon’s interest in establishing a platform for 
structuralist legal history had been more successful. We could imagine that he 
began as he did, conceding the poststructuralist anxiety about causality and the 
interminable relation between law and society. But next, in this imagined 
rewrite, legal structuralism is introduced as a way of responding to this anxiety 
rather than acting as its object. If framed this way, rather than situating legal 
indeterminacy as a more aggressive version of early-twentieth-century legal 
realism, we would encounter the much less familiar idea of structured 
indeterminacy. As I have suggested, in structuralism, but not legal realism, the 
train of legal indeterminacy and its caboose of judicial discretion only make 
sense in the semiotic context of legal constraint, that is, in the context of the 
deep rules of legal grammar. There is certainly a free play of legal argument 
here, but it is a free play only intelligible from inside the governing forms of the 
structure. If Gordon had couched indeterminacy in this structuralist sense, 
rather than attempting to explain the langue through the proxy idea of law’s 
 
 93.  In a frequently cited passage from Roll Over Beethoven, co-authored with Peter Gabel, 
Kennedy distanced himself from the discussion of a fundamental contradiction in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, calling it the tin can hanging around the neck of critical legal studies. Duncan Kennedy 
et. al., Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984). 
 94.  See Hartog, supra note 45, at 153. 
To insist on the constitutive power of law, its capacity to shape lives and understandings 
outside of law, was, in that context, to issue a bold challenge to prevailing scholarly fashions. 
To think of law as a producer of consciousness was to give law a power to challenge most of 
the mainstream discourses about law. Now, a full interrogation of what constitutive means in 
legal history is a subject for another occasion. Today, I am less confident than I was in 1984 
that I understand it. How to distinguish legal values from religious or political values—what 
turns, for example, on calling a faith or belief in promise keeping a legal value—is a question 
that concerns me today. I know that many of the nineteenth-century lay people I study were 
immensely sophisticated in their mobilization and use of legal institutions. They understood 
testator’s freedom; many, even when semiliterate, seemed to have understood the effects of 
the Statute of Frauds on their transactions. But were they constituted by law in any significant 
degree? Or, on the other hand, is it better to describe their consciousness through the lens of 
existential or economic or psychic conflicts (all of which, of course, have some legal features)? 
And when I read legal history that mobilizes the term (usually inspired consciously or 
unconsciously by Gordon), it sometimes seems to me that the word “constitutive” is mobilized 
most often by those who wish to justify the significance of what they do without looking far 
beyond the confines of the law library or the Westlaw or Lexis databases. “Constitutive” then 
becomes a way to foreclose deeper study and exploration. 
Id. See also Joan Williams, Critical Legal Studies: the Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New 
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987). 
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constitutive role in the social, a clearer and more promising vision of 
structuralist legal history might have emerged. 
Unlike prior forms of evolutionary historicism, this distinctive mode of legal 
historiography proceeds on the assumption that the past–present distinction and 
the canon of objective description are both impossible. Rather than offer an 
account of structures progressively evolving over time, structuralist 
historiography denies the possibility of obtaining apodictic accounts of legal 
history, progressive or otherwise.  There is simply no way for the historian to 
get out of the way of her own prefigured interpretive orientations that will 
necessarily shape the forthcoming historical narrative.  Further, rather than 
work in evolutionary historicism’s modern mode and offer an account of legal 
structures functionally emerging in response to preexisting social needs, 
structuralist legal history tends to emphasize the other half of the law-in-society 
dialectic: although it is certainly true that law is shaped by social needs and 
interests, it is also the case, and perhaps more important to understand, that law 
itself shapes social needs and interests.  Law is constitutive of the social.  But for 
structuralist legal history, this point is neither arbitrary nor empirically 
determined; rather it follows from the structrualist emphasis on the langue, the 
idea that law is only relatively indeterminate at its surface levels. Law can be 
meaningfully framed as constitutive of the social because law itself is highly 
structured.  However, it is here that the structuralist historian turns back to the 
poststructuralist anxiety and assures that this langue, this constraining structure, 
is only and ever one single language—a simulacrum, an image, a style. This 
would have been structuralist legal history: a method for aligning legal 
indeterminacy within a structure of formal constraints, with the tendency to 
produce an image of law’s constitutive role in politics, rather than the more 
familiar image of politics as law. 
But it didn’t happen this way. Instead, it was critical or poststructuralist 
historicism that followed in the years after the publication of Critical Legal 
Histories. Writing in a 1997 symposium dedicated to the “arrival of critical 
historicism,” Gordon summarized the state of legal historiography with an 
emphasis on two elements from 1984: (1) legal historians had come around to 
the idea that law’s relation to society was far more complex than had been 
articulated by the modern proponents of evolutionary historicism, and (2) the 
project of writing legal history, as with the project of writing legal holdings, was 
deeply, and happily, indeterminate.95 Both Gordon’s promotion of structuralist 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Gordon, Arrival, supra note 18, at 1024. 
I would say that [critical historicism involves] any approach to the past that produces 
disturbances in the field—that inverts or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery, or 
progress; anything that advances rival perspectives (such as of those as the losers rather than 
the winners) for surveying developments, or that posits alternative trajectories that might have 
produced a very different present—in short, any approach that unsettles the familiar strategies 
that we use to tame the past in order to normalize the present. 
Id. 
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legal history and the idea that law was constitutive of society were gone.  
Indeterminacy emerged as a raw, unstoppable force, capable of twisting any 
argument, and any account, in any way whatsoever.96 This was the 
indeterminacy of legal realism on steroids, unstructured. 
In that same issue that Gordon announced the arrival of critical historicism, 
Terry Fisher pointed to four “critical” styles of historiography littering the field 
at the turn of the new century.97 Fisher did include legal structuralism among 
them, but without hesitation emphasized its desuetude.98 All the action was in 
arguably poststructuralist territory: textualism, contextualism, and new 
historicism.99 These (more or less) poststructuralist modes of historicism were 
certainly distinct from the mid-twentieth century forms of evolutionary 
functionalism and their commitments to the canon of objectivity. The new 
poststructuralist historicism rejected the very possibility of evolutionary 
objectivity, in either its classic or modern mode.100 Writing more than a decade 
later in 2012, Gordon explained: 
A strong antifunctionalist, antideterminist critique tends to dissolve the history of any 
social phenomenon into simply thick description, skeptical alike of grand narratives 
and indeed any accounts of causation. It is all very contingent, all very complicated. To 
the extent this does happen, it is a mixed blessing. It is the job of history—is it not?—
to mess up and complicate the generalizing social sciences’ models of how the world 
works with evidence that in one place or another actual developments skipped a stage 
in a model or went through the stages in reverse or bypassed the stages altogether.101 
This certainly sounds right, and no doubt, poststructuralist historicism is a 
mixed blessing. But as we peer out towards the possibility of contemporary 
legal thought, perhaps we are ready for a new order of things. It no longer 
seems clear, I believe, that poststructuralist historicism has really escaped the 
traces of its functionalist predecessor.102 Is it possible that, a full generation after 
 
 96.  Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 18, at 114. 
 97.  Fisher, supra note 16, at 1075–76. 
 98.  See id. (“Partly as a result [of Duncan Kennedy’s apparent renunciation of the fundamental 
contradiction], in the late 1980s the production of scholarship in the [structuralist] vein diminished 
sharply.”). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See Laura Edwards, The History in Critical Legal Histories, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 187, 197 
(2012). 
As scholars, it is our job to order our evidence, to pull meaning out of it, and to construct 
telling narratives. But we have to do so with the knowledge that there will be no clear, 
definitive result and no end to this process. We will always come up short, even if we learn a 
great deal, because the complications of the past can form a vast array of patterns and we will 
see different ones each time we look, depending on where we are at the time. That tension is 
the point, not the problem—and certainly not a problem that can be solved. 
Id. 
 101.  Gordon, Revisited, supra note 80, at 212. 
 102.  But see Edwards, supra note 100, at 197. 
The contradictions are not about history; they are about historical scholarship, which is deeply 
historicist and profoundly critical of functionalism but still based around functionalism, 
particularly functionalist approaches to the law. And so we remain stalled, as long as history 
itself remains mired in the same functionalist quagmire that Gordon describes in “Critical 
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Critical Legal Histories, that poststructuralist historicism has offered us a 
deepening rather than a chastening of the functionalist style? At first blush, this 
seems totally wrong given Gordon’s merciless annihilation of evolutionary 
historicism. It does seem entirely possible however, and in my mind quite likely, 
that while Gordon’s critique remains as fresh as ever, the mode of 
poststructuralist historicism that followed that critique is also vulnerable to the 
critique itself. If there is good reason to think this is the case, Gordon is in the 
best of company. In one of the most startling and still-relevant law review 
articles of the twentieth century, Felix Cohen raised a critique in the first half of 
his argument that devastated the proposal offered in the second.103 
With this caveat in mind, my suspicion is that the poststructuralism that 
followed Critical Legal Histories actually intensified—in its postobjectivist 
way—the “law and. . .” paradigm of modern evolutionary historicism, rather 
than having brought it to an end. As a result, poststructuralist historicism not 
only lacks the tools we need to see beyond the functionalism of the moderns, it 
actively forecloses the historical methods we need to get past the fatigue of the 
flux and the trace. To move forward, perhaps we need to go back, for, as 
Tomlins suggests,  
[w]here historicism dedifferentiates law by deriving its meaning from its context 
(collapsing law into context), the objective here is to determine how law emerges in 
material practices that construct its categorical differentiation (which is as a practical 
matter observable). We can think of all this as a turn away from post-structural 
historicism, back toward a structuralist account of law.104 
It is absurd to imagine that structuralist legal history is some kind of 
methodological panacea. On its own very stylized terms, it cannot be. But it 
does hold promise and the possibility of making headway in areas yet to be 
explored. Contemporary legal thought, perhaps, is among them. 
 
 
Legal Histories.” We can identify the problem, but we are still so enmeshed within it that we 
cannot yet see our way out. 
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